ABSTRACT: We examine the relation between the cost of equity capital and seven attributes of earnings: accrual quality, persistence, predictability, smoothness, value relevance, timeliness, and conservatism. We characterize the first four attributes as accounting-based because they are typically measured using accounting information only. We characterize the last three attributes as market-based because proxies for these constructs are typically based on relations between market data and accounting data. Based on theoretical models predicting a positive association between information quality and cost of equity, we test for and find that firms with the least favorable values of each attribute, considered individually, generally experience larger costs of equity than firms with the most favorable values. The largest cost of equity effects are observed for the accounting-based attributes, in particular, accrual quality. These findings are robust to controls for innate determinants of the earnings attributes (firm size, cash flow and sales volatility, incidence of loss, operating cycle, intangibles use/intensity, and capital intensity), as vi/ell as to alternative proxies for the cost of equity capital.
favorable values of seven earnings characteristics are associated with benefits in the form of a lower cost of equity capital. The properties we consider are attributes used in previous accounting research and in descriptions of accounting practice to characterize desirable features of earnings: accrual quality, persistence, predictability, smoothness, value relevance, timeliness, and conservatism. Our intent is to determine whether each attribute matters to investors, and to calibrate which attributes matter most, as evidenced by the strength of the association between the attribute and estimates of the cost of equity. ' Our research is predicated on a relation between the cost of equity and properties of firm-specific information and on the presumption that earnings is a premier source of such information. Analytical research {described in Section II) by Easley and O'Hara (2004) , O'Hara (2003) , and Leuz and Verrecchia (2004) demonstrates that firm-specific information risk is priced (that is, it affects the cost of equity), and this risk cannot be diversified away. The presumption that earnings is a premier source of firm-specific information is supported by empirical research (Biddlc et al. 1995; Francis et al. 2003; Liu et al. 2002) which shows that investors rely on earnings more than any other summary measure of performance (i.e., dividends, cash flows, or variants of earnings, such as EBITDA). Survey results also indicate that managers view earnings as the key metric evaluated by investors and analysts (Graham et al. 2003) .
Our investigations are motivated by descriptions, in accounting research and elsewhere, of desirable attributes of financial reporting systems in general and earnings in particular; we provide examples of such descriptions in Section II. We assume that earnings attributes are desirable to the extent they reduce information risk and thereby result in a discernible capital market advantage. We calibrate this advantage using as our benchmark the equity cost of capital. Taking earnings as a premier source of firm-specific information, and under the view that properties of firm-specific information risk affect the cost of equity, we investigate the association between earnings attributes and costs of equity along three dimensions. First, we test the prediction that more unfavorable values of the earnings attributes are associated with higher costs of equity capital. Second, we compare the relative magnitudes of the cost of equity effects across attributes to determine which earnings attributes matter most to investors. Third, we test for conditional effects of earnings attributes, identify whether earnings attributes have distinct cost of equity effects (as opposed to a subset of the attributes subsuming the others), and assess whether earnings variability, an instrument for accrual quality and smoothness, subsumes these attributes. The second and third tests are motivated by the fact that many descriptions of earnings attributes focus on a single attribute in isolation, without regard to whether that attribute would be desirable or undesirable in the presence of other earnings attributes.
Because we recognize that the earnings attributes we consider are jointly determined by management's (discretionary) reporting and implementation decisions and by intrinsic (innate) features of firms' business models and operating environments, we examine separately the cost of equity effects of the total (innate plus discretionary) amount of each attribute as well as the effects of the discretionary component. Controlling for innate determinants of earnings attributes in cost of capital regressions, we interpret the coefficient estimates on the earnings attributes as capturing the pricing of the discretionary (incremental) component of each attribute. The innate factors we consider are size, cash flow variability, sales variability, length of operating cycle, incidence of losses, intangibles intensity, and capital intensity. We emphasize that our interpretation of this coefficient as the cost of equity effect of the discretionary portion of that attribute relies on both the .sufficiency of the set of innate factors and the prediction that discretionary components of earnings attributes are priced in equihbrium.
We characterize the seven earnings attributes as either "accounting-based" or "marketbased" to capture differences in underlying assumptions about the function of earnings, which are, in turn, reflected in the way the attributes are measured. We refer to accrual quality, persistence, predictability, and smoothness as "accounting-based." These attributes take cash or earnings itself as the reference construct and consequently are measured using accounting information only. We refer to value relevance, timeliness, and conservatism as "market-based." These attributes take returns or prices as the reference construct; consequently, measures of these attributes are based on the estimated relation between accounting earnings and market prices or returns. We believe these differences in reference constructs are related to implicit assumptions about the intended function of accounting. Specifically, accounting-based earnings attributes derive from an implicit assumption that the function of earnings is the effective allocation of cash flows to reporting periods via the accruals process, while market-based attributes derive from an implicit assumption that the function of earnings is to reflect economic income as represented by stock returns.
Our measures of earnings attributes follow prior research. In terms of the accountingbased attributes, prior studies measure accrual quality using either the mapping of current accruals into cash flows or some measure of abnormal accruals (e.g., Dechow and Dichev 2002; Francis et al. 2005) ; measures of earnings persistence typically rely on the estimated slope coefficient in a regression of current earnings on lagged earnings (e.g.. Lev 1983) ; measures of earnings predictability focus on the prediction errors from a time-series earnings model (e.g., Lipe 1990) ; and smoothness measures are based on the volatility of earnings relative to some benchmark, such as cash flows (e.g., Leuz et al. 2003; Thomas and Zhang 2002) . In terms of the market-based attributes, many prior studies measure value relevance as the R~ from a regression of annual returns on annual earnings (e.g.. Collins et al. 1997; Francis and Schipper 1999) . Reverse regressions of earnings on variables capturing positive stock returns and negative stock returns provide measures of timeliness (the reverse regression R', e.g., Bushman et al. 2004; Ball et al. 2000) and conservatism (the ratio of the reverse regression coefficient on negative returns to the coefficient on positive returns, e.g., Basu (1997) ; Pope and Walker (1999) .
From a research design perspective, our study is related to Gebhardt et al. (2001) who examine whether implied cost of equity estimates derived from a residual income model are associated with beta, leverage, size, book-to-market, price momentum, growth, and earnings variability. They calibrate their implied cost of equity estimates by showing associations with variables known or expected to be related to expected returns. Our focus is the opposite; we take the cost of equity estimates as given, and use them to calibrate the earnings attributes. Our calibration is guided by prior research, which generally considers earnings attributes one at a time. Because this research describes the attributes we consider as desirable, we expect that an unfavorable outcome for each attribute, considered alone, is associated with a higher cost of capital. Our results generally confirm this prediction.
Using annual cross-sectional regressions of cost of equity proxies on beta, size, and book-to-market ratio over 1975-2001, we find that when the attributes are added one at a time, they are (generally) significantly positively associated with the cost of equity capital (at the 0.01 level). The positive associations mean that firms with the least favorable values of each attribute have higher costs of equity than firms with the most favorable values, controlling for known risk factors. The magnitudes of these associations are reduced when controls for innate determinants are included in the regressions, consistent with a portion of each attribute being explained by these determinants. In economic terms, the largest effect (controlling for risk proxies and innate determinants) is a 261 basis point (bp) differential cost of equity capital between the best and worst accrual quality deciles. The effects associated with accounting-based attributes generally exceed those associated with market-based attributes; for example, after controlling for risk factors and innate determinants, value relevance has the largest cost of equity effect among the market-based attributes {an 81 bp difference in the cost of equity between the best and worst value relevance deciles).
Prior research does not provide a basis for predicting either differences in the relative magnitudes of the cost of equity effects of earnings attributes or the conditional cost of equity relations among those attributes. As we discuss in Section VII. we believe evidence on relative and conditional effects has practical value for investors, researchers, standard setters, and firm managers. In conditional tests that consider all seven earnings attributes jointly and control for risk factors and innate determinants, four attributes are strongly positively associated with the cost of equity: accrual quality (260 bp spread), smoothness (207 bp spread), persistence (110 bp spread), and value relevance (77 bp spread). We conclude that accounting-based attributes have more pronounced cost of equity effects than do market-based attributes, and that among accounting-based attributes, accrual quality has the largest effects.
These results are generally robust to a battery of sensitivity tests, including alternative econometric specifications and alternative measures of some earnings attributes, in addition, we show that the inclusion of earnings variability reduces the cost of equity effects associated with accrual quality and smoothness, as one would expect given that earnings variability is an instrument for these attributes. We note that, by construction, our findings are dependent on the reliability of the cost of equity estimates used as the dependent variable in our tests. As we discuss in Section III. we believe the Value Line estimates used in our main tests are preferred to other estimates. We also show (in Sections V and VI) that analyses using implied cost of equity estimates derived from PEG ratios and analyses using ex post cost of equity estimates based on realized future returns produce similar results.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II frames our research questions in the context of the relevant literature. Section III describes the sample and data. Section IV discusses the innate determinants of the earnings attributes. Sections V and VI report the empirical results, and Section VII summarizes and concludes.
II. CAPITAL MARKET CONSEQUENCES OE EIRM-SPECIEIC INFORMATION AND DESCRIPTION OE EARNINGS ATTRIBUTES AS SOURCES OE EIRM-SPECIEIC INEORMATION
In this section we summarize research that demonstrates that firm-specific information factors affect the cost of capital in equilibrium. We describe the earnings attributes we consider and we discuss earnings variability as an instrument for two of these attributes.
Research on Capital Market Consequences of Eirm-Specific Information
Support for the view that properties of firm-specific information affect expected returns is provided by, for example, incomplete information models (e.g., Merton 1987) , liquidity effect models (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson 1986; Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Brennan et al. 1998) , and asymmetric information models (e.g., Admati 1985) .-Labeling the effect See O'Hara (2003) for an overview of the literature that predicts that asset returns are, in part, a function of firm-specific information.
of firm-specific information properties a "cost of capital" effect in the traditional sense, however, requires an equilibrium model in which information properties are rationally priced. That is, it requires a model with rational agents, in which information effects cannot be diversified away.
Two distinct approaches to developing such a model are taken by Easley and O'Hara (2004) and O'Hara (2003) , and by Leuz and Verrecchia (2004) . Easley and O'Hara (2004) show that in a multi-asset, multi-period setting with informed and uninformed investors, the information risk faced by the uninformed investors is not diversifiable and will therefore be priced. In particular, required returns are affected by information risk, captured both by the extent of private information and by the precision of both public and private information, with more private information and less precise information (both public and private) leading to higher required returns. Taking a different approach, Leuz and Verrecchia (2004) consider the role of performance reports (e.g., earnings) in aligning firms and investors with respect to capital investments. Poor-quality reporting impairs the coordination between firms and their investors with respect to the firm's capital investment decisions and thereby creates information risk. Anticipating this, investors demand a higher risk premium; that is. they charge a higher cost of capital. Leuz and Verrecchia (2004) show that even in an economy with many firms and a systematic component to the pay-off from investment, a portion of this risk is nondiversifiable.
Empirical tests of the predicted positive relation between information risk and the cost of capital use different characterizations of information risk. For example: Easley et al. (2002) focus on the information asymmetry between informed and uninformed traders, which they operationalize using probability of informed trading (PIN) scores; Francis et al. (2005) focus on accrual quality (measured as the strength of mapping of current accruals into cash flows); and Botosan (1997) focuses on disclosure scores based on the quantity of annual report information. In an international context, Bhattacharya et al. (2003) examine the association between country-level measures of the average cost of equity and earnings opacity, defined as a composite measure of earnings aggressiveness, loss avoidance, and smoothness. Each of these studies predicts and finds a relation between the information factor(s) they consider and the cost of capital. ' Our research, which is premised on the existence of this relation, examines whether seven earnings attributes that are viewed as distinct by many in accounting research and in practice have empirically distinguishable effects on firm-specific risk premia. We interpret the strength and magnitude of the association between a given earnings attribute and the cost of equity as a quantitative measure of the desirability of that attribute from the perspective of investors' capital allocation decisions. In particular, we view each earnings attribute as proxying either for the uncertainty in earnings as an informative signal about the pay-off structure that is of interest to investors (as captured by the accounting-based attributes) or for investors' perception of that uncertainty (as captured by the market-based attributes). Our study builds on Francis et at. (2005) , Barth and Landsman (2003) , Cohen (2003) , and Barone (2003) , who each examine the cost of capital effects of one financial reporting attribute- Francis et al. (2005) examine accrual quality, Barth and Landsman (2003) examine value relevance, Cohen (2003) examines a measure that is similar to the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual quality measure, and Barone (2003) examines the Lev Bhattacharya et ai.'s (2003) results, based on a sample of 34 countries over [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] . are sensitive to the cost of equity proxy. Earnings aggressiveness is positively associated with their dividend-based cost of equity estimates, while loss avoidance is positively associated with the international pricing model-based cost of equity estimates; in neither case does a country's earnings smoothness have a measurable eti^'cct on its cost of equity.
and Thiagarajan (1993) fundamental score and a second (self-constructed) score based on financial statement ratios-but do not address whether the attribute they examine is the only earnings property that matters to investors, or if it is the one that matters most.
Earnings Attributes
In this subsection we first describe our primary measure of each earnings attribute that we consider and explain how prior research has characterized each attribute as desirable. We then discuss how the attributes are linked to information risk.
Accounting-Based and Market-Based Earnings Attributes
Accrual quality. Several approaches to assessing earnings quality take the view that earnings that map more closely into cash are more desirable (e.g.. Penman 2001, 611; Harris et al. 2000) . Dechow and Dichev (2002) propose and test a measure of earnings quality that captures the mapping of current accruals into last-period, current-period, and next-period cash flows, and Francis et al. (2005) demonstrate that this measure (which they term accrual quality) is associated with measures of the cost of debt and equity capital. We use the Dechow-Dichev measure to capture the quality of accruals.
Persistence. This captures earnings sustainability; persistent earnings are viewed as desirable because they are recurring (e.g.. Penman and Zhang 2002; Revsine et al. 2002, 245; Richardson 2003) . Analysts sometimes focus on sustainable or recurring earnings (see, for example. AlCPA 1994. Chapter 6). We measure earnings persistence as the slope coefficient from a regression of current earnings on lagged earnings.
Predictability. Following Lipe (1990) , we define this construct as the ability of earnings to predict itself. Predictability is an element of relevance in the FASB's Conceptual Framework, and is therefore a desirable earnings attribute from the perspective of standard setters. Predictability is also valued by analysts (see, for example, the AIMR's [1993] description of the distinction between financial reporting and financial analysis) and is an essential component of valuation (see, for example. Lee 11999] for a discussion).
Smootbness. Discussions of the benefits of smooth earnings include Ronen and Sadan (1981) . Chaney and Lewis (1995). and Demski (1998) . Arguments that smoothness is a desirable earnings attribute derive from the view that managers use their private information about future income to smooth out transitory fluctuations and thereby achieve a more representative, hence more useful, reported earnings number. We follow Leuz et al. (2003) in using cash flows as the reference construct for unsmoothed earnings, and measure smoothness as the ratio of income variability to cash flow variability.
Value relevance. This construct is often measured as the ability of earnings to explain variation in returns, where greater explanatory power is viewed as desirable. One stream of this research interprets value relevance as a direct measure of decision usefulness (e.g., Joos and Lang 1994; Collins et al. 1997; Francis and Schipper 1999; Lev and Zarowin 1999) . This interpretation rests on the view that value relevance measures capture combined relevance and reliability, two key concepts in the FASB's Conceptual Framework (for an extended discussion, see Barth et al. 2001) . Our measure of value relevance is the explanatory power of earnings level and change for returns.
Timeliness and Conservatism. These two attributes derive from the view that accounting earnings is intended to measure economic income, defined as changes in market value of equity (see, for example. Ball et al. 2000) . The reference construct for both measures is stoek returns; timeliness is the explanatory power of a reverse regression of earnings on returns and conservatism is the ratio of the slope coefficients on negative returns to the The Accounting Review, October 2004 slope coefficients on positive returns in a reverse regression of earnings on returns. Conservatism therefore differs from timeliness in that it reflects the differential ability of accounting earnings to reflect economic losses (measured as negative stock returns) versus economic gains (measured as positive stock returns). Combined timeliness and conservatism are sometimes described as "transparency," a desirable attribute of accounting earnings (see. for example. Ball et al. 2000) . Watts (2003) presents several arguments supporting the view that conservatism is a desirable attribute of earnings; broadly speaking, these arguments derive from the asymmetric costs of overpayments versus underpayments to firm stakeholders and the role of conservative reporting in constraining such payments.
Earnings Attributes as Proxies for Information Risk
Information risk derives from imprecision (i.e., dispersion) in estimates of the pay-off structure to investors based on available information (Easley and O'Hara 2004) or from impaired coordination between managers and investors with respect to capital investment decisions {Leuz and Verrecchia 2004). Both perspectives point to within-firm free cash flows to common equity (FCF^^) as fundamental in the assessment of information risk. That is. FCF^^' determines investor pay-offs in the form of dividends and capital gains, so uncertainty about FCF* ^-is one source of information risk as characterized by Easley and O'Hara (2004) . Similarly, FCF*-^ is operating cash flows less capital investments (adjusted for financing) and it is uncertainty about the investment element of FCF^^ that gives rise to information risk in Leuz and Verrecchia's (2004) characterization. Based on these characterizations (which develop information risk as a priced factor), we predict that an unfavorable outcome for each earnings attribute, considered alone, will be associated with a higher cost of equity capital to the extent that attribute captures one or more aspects of uncertainty about future FCF^'^.
Prior research does not provide a basis for predicting either the relative magnitudes of the cost of equity effects across earnings attributes or their conditional associations (that is, when all attributes are considered together, does a subset of attributes subsume the others'?). We provide qualitative arguments that suggest differences in these relations. For example, if investors perceive that information quality increases as earnings is more effective in capturing information that is already in prices/returns, then market-based attributes should have larger cost of equity effects than accounting-based attributes. Conversely, if investors believe that information quality increases as earnings is more effective in allocating cash receipts and disbursements across reporting periods, then accounting-based attributes should have larger effects.
Among the accounting-based earnings attributes we consider, we view accrual quality as having the most direct link to information risk. Accrual quality captures variation in the mapping of earnings into operating cash flows, a key element of the pay-off structure that is of interest to investors. We also view persistence as having a direct link to information risk, because greater persistence is associated with a more sustainable earnings stream-ii' earnings are persistent, then investors need not be concerned about the extent to which the innovation in this period's earnings will continue, and this reduces one source of uncertainty.
We view the link between information risk and both predictability and smoothness as less direct than the links between information risk and either persistence or accrual quality. While highly predictable earnings and smoothed earnings do much to eliminate uncertainty ahoul earnings, the link to information risk requires that these attributes not be achieved at the expense of impairing earnings' informativeness about the pay-off structure that is of interest to investors. For example, managers might make reporting choices opportunistically in order to report either or both extremely smooth and predictable earnings, but if those choices reduce the ability of earnings to convey information about future FCF^*^^. then the result will not be a reduction in information risk."* That is, if cash flows are variable, then reporting extremely smooth or predictable earnings would not assist investors in understanding cash flows. In addition, those reporting choices would impair accruals quality, because that earnings attribute captures the mapping of accruals into cash flows.
Turning now to the link between market-based earnings attributes and information risk, to the extent value relevance captures information reliability and the latter increases earnings precision as an indicator of FCF''\ greater value relevance will reduce information risk. Value relevance can also be linked directly to information risk: if returns are taken as the summary indicator of all public information on the pay-off structure that is of interest to investors, then an earnings number that also summarizes the same information will be associated with less information risk. Arguments for a link between information risk and timeliness parallel those for a link between information risk and value relevance; however, because the measures of timeliness differ from those of value relevance, there is no particular reason to expect either to dominate empirically. We view the link between information risk and conservatism as tenuous, because the latter implies, by definition, a bias in information, while information risk pertains to uncertainty about the true values of pay-offs. That is, conservatism is related to the precision of bad news, while information risk is related to the precision of both good and bad news.
We do not specify formal hypotheses about either the cost of equity effects of earnings attributes considered one at a time or their conditional effects when all attributes are considered together. Rather, we aim to shed light on the empirical issue of which attributes are most strongly associated with capital market benefits in the form of a lower cost of equity. However, we believe that our qualitative discussion of the relations between information risk and earnings attributes suggests that, among the accounting-based attributes, accrual quality and persistence will have the most powerful effects and, among the market-based attributes, value relevance and/or timeliness will have the most powerful effects. This expectation rests on the relatively more direct mappings between these earnings attributes and uncertainty about the structure of future free cash flows.
Earnings Variability
Earnings variability (the standard deviation of earnings) is an instrument for accrual quality and smoothness.*^ Dechow and Dichev (2002. Table 4) show that for their sample and time period, earnings variability is the strongest instrument for their accrual quality measure. Earnings variability is also an instrument for smoothness, since the two measures differ only in the presence or absence of standardization by cash flow variability. Because earnings variability is expected to reflect some combination of the two attributes for which it is an instrument, we do not include it as a separate attribute. Rather, we test the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of earnings variability; results are reported in Section VI.
'' While persistence is potentially subject to the same earnings management concerns, we believe il is more difficult to use reporting choices (such as accruals manipulation) to make an innovation appear to stay in the earnings series when, in fact, it does not. Stated differently, predictability and smoothness relate primarily to the variability of the earnings series, whereas persistence relates both to the level of earnings and to the variability of the innovation series. ' Prior research suggests earnings variability may also be an instrument for conservatism. Specifically. Givoly and Hayn (2000) argue that one manifestation of conservatism-the more immediate recognition of bad news-leads to increased variability of earnings. Because we find very small correlations between our measures of earnings variability and conservatism (-0.02 Pearson. 0.02 Spearman), we do not include conservatism among the attributes for which earnings variability may be an instrument.
III. SAMPLE, DATA, AND VARIABLE MEASUREMENT Our sample covers the 27 years, / = 1975-2001 . We calculate the earnings attributes over rolling Hrm-specitic ten-year windows; a Hrm is included in the year / sample if data are available in years t-9 to t. To mitigate concerns that differences in sample composition drive comparisons acros.s attributes, we further require that data on all seven attributes are available for each firm-year. Table 1 shows that the number of firms meeting these requirements (the "Full Sample," representing an average of 52.9 percent of the CRSP market capitalization) ranges from 678 to 1.997 per year, for an average of 1.471 firms per year and a total of 3,917 distinct firms.
Our cross-sectional tests also require data on the cost of equity capital. Our main tests use Brav et al. (2004) ex ante measures, which are derived from price target and dividend data provided in Value Line (VL) reports. These ex anle measures use the VL analyst's four-year-out target price (7'^) and his forecast of next period dividends [DIV) and dividend growth (,t,' ). Assuming that interim dividends are reinvested at the firm cost of equity capital (CofC). Brav et al. (2004) arrive at the following expression for the ex ante expected return:
here P = stock priee nine days prior to the date of the VL report. The value of CofC that satisfies the equality is the estimate of the ex ante cost of equity capital. This CofC estimate is qualitatively the same as the VL measure used by Botosan and Plumiee (2002) and evaluated by Botosan and Flumlee (2005) .
We evaluate the sensitivity of our results to CofC estimates derived from two PEG approaches (Easton 2004) . We choose VL CofC estimates as our primary measure and PBG-based CofC estimates as our secondary measure for three reasons. Eirst, in a comparison of the construct validity of four proxies for the expected cost of equity (the VL CofC estimate, a Gordon growth model estimate, a residual income estimate based on Ohlson and Juttner-Nauroth [2000] , and an estimate based on Ea.stoiVs [2004] PEG approach), Botosan and Plumiee (2005) conclude that the VL-based CofC estimate and the PEG-based estimate outpertbrm the other approaches. In separate tests, Guay et al. (2003) examine the significance of the slope coefficients from regressing future realized returns on implied costs of equity derived from two residual income models, one implementation of the Ohlson and Juttner-Nauroth (2004) model, and a Gordon growth model. The highest tstatistics reported by Guay et al. (2003, Tables 3 and 6 ) are 0.69 for one-year-ahead returns, 2.47 for two-year-ahead returns, and 0.98 for three-year-ahead returns.^ In contrast, when we repeat Guay et al.'s (2003) tests for our VL CofC estimates, we find t-statistics of 17.92 for one-year-ahead returns, 19.53 for two-year-ahead returns, and 21.98 for three-year-ahead returns. On the whole, we interpret these results as indicating that VL CofC estimates are strongly preferred to estimates based on residual income models and weakly preferred to PEG-based CofC estimates.
Second, in our setting, a residual-income-based approach to estimating the cost of equity (such as used by Gebhardt et al. [2002] ), or a PEG approach (such as used by Easton Easton and Monahan (2(X)4) show no significani positive correlations between realized returns and implied costs of equity from PEG and residual-income-based models that use analysis' earnings forecasts. 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 ^-2001, ' 7f Market Cap is the ratio of the market value of the indicated sample to the market value of the total CRSP population with share price and shares traded data available in December of the indicated year. Mean and Distinct refer to the average number of firms per year, and the total number of distinct firms, respectively, in the indicated sample.
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[2(304]) restricts the sample in important ways, because these earnings-based approaches require either or both positive earnings and increasing earnings.^ These restrictions likely bias the samples toward more stable and less risky firms than methods that do not impose these restrictions (such as approaches ba.sed on price targets and dividend forecasts). This bias is problematic in our setting because some of the earnings attributes we consider (e.g., persistence) may be correlated with stability and risk. Third, within the set of CofC estimates that use target prices as inputs, prior research shows that VL data exhibit the least optimism. Brav et al. (2004) . Over this period. Value Line followed about 1,700 firms: this sample is reduced by the requirement that a firm has data on CofC and the seven earnings attributes. Table 1 shows that the number of firms meeting these requirements (the "VL Sample") ranges between 524 and 1,022 firms per year, with an average of 790 firms per year, a total sample of 21,334 firm-year observations and 1,865 distinct firms. The VL samp]e covers, on average, 47.4 percent of the CRSP market capitalization.
Because VL's 13-week forecast cycle does not conform to either calendar or fiscal quarters, we assign the VL observations on CofC to each calendar quarter using the date of the VL report containing the forecast information, e.g., a February VL report is assigned to the first calendar quarter. To avoid inflating significance levels by using overlapping observations, we average the quarterly CofC estimates for year t to generate one CofC estimate for each firm-year. (We find similar results if we use the CofC estimate for the last quarter of the year.) Table 2 shows that the yeaHy mean values of CofC range between 12.41 percent (in 1997) and 33.19 percent (in 1975) ; the pooled sample average (median) is 20.8 percent (20.2 percent), with a standard deviation of 7.76 percent. While these CofC estimates may appear high, we note the following. First, for our sample firms and time period, the average realized annual return is 18.7 percent; assuming rational expectations, this implies average optimism in the VL CofC estimates of (only) about 2.1 percent. Second, inspection of the data in Table 2 shows that the largest CofC estimates are observed in 1975-1982 (realized returns are also high in this period; the average equal-weighted market return was 2.58 percent per month, or about 31 percent annualized). In unreported tests, we find qualitatively similar results if we exclude this subperiod from our analyses. Third, values of CofC for Easton's (2004) PHG and MPEG approaches also require that earnings forecasts arc both positive and increasing. Further evidence of optimism in First Call target prices is reported by Bradshaw (2002) , who documents a mean ratio of target price to observed price of 1.36. The lower optimism of VL is consistent with VL not performing a number of investment banking functions, which prior research finds leads to optimism in sell-side analysts' forecasts. In particular, as Francis and Philbrick (1993) discuss, VL performs no underwriting, consulting, or brokerage functions. 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Section VI, values of the VL CofC estimates for our sample are statistically indistinguishable from CofC estimates based on PEG ratios. Finally, even if the CofC estimates are biased upward (for example, due to analyst optimism about long-term target prices), this bias will not affect our inferences unless it is correlated with the earnings attributes. Some support for the view that bias in target prices is unrelated to earnings attributes is reported by Brav et ai. (2004) , who tind no evidence that this bias is correlated with variables known or expected to be related to expected returns (such as beta, size, and book-to-market).
Our analyses require measures of the seven earnings attributes that we study and of earnings variability, an instrument for two of the attributes. Our construction of these measures is based on prior research. In defining the earnings attributes, we adopt the convention that larger values of the attribute indicate less favorable outcomes. We measure the seven attributes and earnings variability on a firm-and year-specific basis, using the relevant accounting and/or market information for rolling ten-year windows, ^-9,..., t. (We obtain nearly identical results if we lag the estimation period by one year, i.e., t-\0,..., l-\.) The use of the firm as its own benchmark mitigates concerns that differences among firms in a given industry give rise to noisy measures of the constructs, as would be the case if we measured the attributes by reference to industry norms. However, the firm-specific approach requires a time-series of observations about each firm, while an industry approach requires only a sufficient size cross-section of firms in a given industry at a point in time. The tenyear time-series requirement biases our sample toward surviving firms, which are likely to be larger and more successful than firms that do not meet this data requirement. On balance, we believe that the benefits afforded by the use of the firm as its own benchtnark offset the sample bias toward larger, more successful firms.'" Our measure of accrual quality is based on Dechow and Dichev's (2002) model relating current accruals to lagged, current, and future cash flows from operations:
where:
TCAj, = firm /s total current accruals in year /, = {ACAj, -ACLj, -ACashj, AssetSj, = firm/s average total assets in year t and t-\; and CFOj, = cash flow from operations in year l, is calculated as net income before extraordinary items (NIBE, Compustat #18) less total accruals (TA), where: = \CAj_, -ACL,, -ACashj, + ASTDEBT,, -DEPN,,; jj = firm y's change in current assets (Compustat #4) between year t-1 and year /;
In Table 10 , we report results of tests based on factor-mimicking portfolios that include firms with as few as 24 CRSP monthly returns. This sample (18.865 firms) Ineludes smaller and younger finns that lack, lime series data on the earnings aitribules. We use the indirect (balance sheet) approach to estimate accruals rather than the direct (statement of cash flows) approach. Although the former suffers from measurement error in accruals, especially for firms with merger and acquisition activity or discontinued operations (Hribar and Collins 2002) , it allows us to calculate accruals for a larger sample of firms and over a longer period than is possible with the direct approach. In particular, the direct approach requires dala from the statement of cash Hows; these data are not available prior to 1988, the year in which SFAS No. 95 was effeciive, A ten-year daia requirement would, therefore, restrict our sample to firms with ihe necessary data in ihe sub-period 1999-2001, j = firm/s change in current liabilities (Compustat #5) between year t-1 and year r; \Cashj, = firm/s change in cash {Compustat #1) between year l-{ and year r; = firm /s change in debt in current liabilities (Compustat #34) between year l-\ and year /; and j = tirm/s depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat #14) in year t.
For each firm-year, we estimate Equation (1) using rolling ten-year windows. These estimations yield ten firm-and year-specific residuals, v^,, / = f-9,..., t, which form the basis for tbe accrual quality metric, AccrualQualityj, = a(Vj,), equal to the standard deviation of firm/s estimated residuals. Large (small) values of AccrualQuality correspond to poor (good) accrual quality.
Following previous research (e.g.. Lev 1983; AH and Zarowin 1992) we measure earnings persistence as tbe slope coefficient estimate, cfc, ^, from an autoregressive model of order one (ARl) for annual split-adjusted earnings per share (Xj,, measured as firm/s net income before extraordinary items in year t divided by tbe weighted average number of outstanding shares during year /):
For each firm-year, we estimate Equation (2) using maximum likelibood estimation and rolling ten-year windows. This procedure yields firm-and year-specific estimates of 4),^, which capture the persistence of earnings.'-Values of 4), ^ close to 1 imply highly persistent earnings, while values of tfj,, close to 0 imply bigbly transitory earnings. In order to conform this variable to our ordering of attributes, we use the negative of tbe ARI parameter. Persistence = -(|), ., so tbat larger (smaller) values of Persistence correspond to less (more) persistent earnings. Our measure of earnings predictability is also derived from tbe firmand year-specific ARl models. Based on Lipe (1990) , we use the square root of the error variance from Equation (2), Predictability = VCT^.). Large (small) values of Predictability imply less (more) predictable earnings.
We define smoothness as tbe ratio of firm/s standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items divided by beginning total assets, to its standard deviation of casb flows from operations divided by beginning total assets. Smoothness^, = (r{NlBEj,) /(j(CFOj,) .^Ŝ tandard deviations are calculated over rolling ten-year windows. Larger values of Smoothness indicate less earnings smoothness.
'^ We use an ARl model {with drift) of annual earnings, rather than a higher order speciHcalion suggested by Finger (1994) and Baginski et al. (1999) , because we wish to estimate firm-specific persistence measures for a broad sample of firms over rolling ten-year windows. Using higher-order specifications increases the number of parameters to be estimated and. therefore, increases the length of the time-series needed for ihe estimation; in turn, this restricts the sample to firms with the necessary data. For example. Finger (1994) estimates AR models of orders 2, 4, and 8 for a sample of 50 firms with at least 40 yearly observations over the period 1935 -1987 Baginski et al. (1999) estimate ARIMA (2.1,0) models (among others) for 162 firms with a complete scries of annual data for 1967-1990 (24 years) . '-' Our measure of smoothness is similar to those used by Leuz et al. (2003) and Hunt et al. (2(X) 0). Leuz et al. (2003) examine the ratio of the standard deviation of operating income scaled by assets, to the standard deviation of cash flows from opierations scaled hy assets; Hunt et al. (2000) examine the ratio of the standard deviation of nondiscretionary net income (equal to operating cash flows plus nondiscretionary accruals) to the standard deviation of cash flows from operations.
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Following Francis and Schipper (1999) , Collins et al. (1997) . and Bushman et al. (2004) . our measure of value relevance is based on the explained variability from the following regression of returns on the level and change in earnings:
RETj^ -firm/s 15-month return ending three months after the end of fiscal year t; EARNj, = firm/s income before extraordinary items in year t (NIBE), scaled by market value at the end of year / -1; and AEARN-^ = change in firm/s NIBE in year /, scaled by market value at the end of year r-1.
We estimate Equation (3) for each firm over rolling ten-year windows. To conform this variable to our ordering scheme, we take the negative of the adjusted R' from Equation (3), Relevance = -R]j,^^ii,y Large (small) values of Relevance imply less (more) value relevant earnings.
Our measures of timeliness and conservatism are derived from reverse regressions, which use earnings as the dependent variable and returns measures as independent variables:
where NEG-, = 1 '\i RETj, < 0 and 0 otherwise; all other variables are as previously defined.
Similar to our other attributes, Equation (4) is estimated on a firm-and year-specific basis, using rolling ten-year windows. Following Ball et al. (2000) and Bushman et al. (2004) , our measure of timeliness is based on the explanatory power of Equation (4): similar to Relevance, we use the negative of the adjusted R' from Equation (4), Timeliness = -Klu^i^y Following Basu (1997), Pope and Walker (1999) . and Givoly and Hayn (2000) . our measure of conservatism is the negative of the ratio of the coefficient on bad news to the coefficient on good news. Conservatism = -(3,^ + (3TJ)/P|^. Larger values of Timeliness and Conservatism imply less timely and less conservative earnings, respectively.
Information about the pooled sample distribution of the earnings attribute measures for the Full Sample is reported in Table 3 , Panel A; for purposes of this table, we winsorize values of each attribute to the 99 percent and I percent values (subsequent tests use the ranks of variables to avoid outlier concerns). Results (not reported) are similar for the VL Sample. The AccrualQuality measure has mean (median) value of 0.026 (0.019); as a benchmark, Dechow and Dichev (2002) report mean (median) values of 0.028 (0.020) for their sample of 1,752 firms over 1987-1999. Persistence, which captures (the negative of) the extent to which an earnings innovation remains in the series, has a mean (median) value of -0.482 (-0.520); as a benchmark, the average implied ARl parameter reported by Baginski et al. (1999) for 162 firms with a complete series of data over 1967-1990 is 0.54. Predictability has a mean (median) value of 0.876 (0.536) and a standard deviation of 1,054, indicating both dispersion and skewness. Finally, Smoothness, which captures the variability of income relative to the variability of cash flows, has mean (median) value of 0.640 (0.578). In comparison, Leuz et al. (2003) report a mean smoothness measure of 0.765 (for all U.S. firm-year observations, 1990-1999) and Hunt et al. (2000) report descriptive data implying a mean ratio of income volatility to cash volatility of 0.51.
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T\iming to the three market-based earnings attribute measures. Relevance (the negative of the adjusted R' in a returns-earnings regression) has a mean (median) value ot" -0.423 (-0.416); this compares to a mean (median) value of -0.466 (-0.465) for Timeliness (the negative of the adjusted R-in a reverse regression of earnings on returns). Our sample values of Relevance and Timeliness are roughly similar to those reported by Bushman el al. (2004) , for a sample of 784 firms in the Fortune 1000, namely, a mean R-from firmspecific regressions of Equation (3) of 0.37. and a mean R-value of 0.33 for firm-specific regressions of Equation (4). Finally. Consetralism. the negative of the ratit) of the coefficients on negative returns to the coefficient on positive returns in a reverse regression of earnings on returns, has a mean (median) value of -0.547 (-1.00) and a standard deviation of 27.46.'"' The mean value for our sample is smaller in magnitude than the values reported by Basu (1997) (who reports 4.66) and by Givoly and Hayn (2000) (who report a range of 1.7 to 25.8); our measure of Conservatism is derived from firm-specific regressions, while theirs are based on cross-seclional regressions.
Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman (below diagonal) pairwise correlations among the seven attributes are reported in Table 3 Further evidence on the degree of overlap among the earnings attributes is provided in the far right column of Panel B. where we report auxiliary R' statistics. The auxiliary Rf or attribute k is the R' obtained from regressing attribute k on the other six attributes; this statistic is analogous to a multivariate correlation between each attribute and all other attributes (the square root of the auxiliary R' is the Pearson multivariate correlation). While these data show auxiliary R's as high as 0.51 for some attributes, in no case is the square root of this measure substantially larger than the largest pairwise correlation. This result indicates that the degree of overlap across attributes is reasonably approximated by (no more than) the largest pairwise correlation for each attribute.
We draw three conclusions from the results in Table 3 . First, values of the earnings attributes measured for our sample are roughly similar to values reported in prior studies, except for conservatism. Second, there is relatively little overlap between the accountingba.sed and the market-based attributes. This finding is consistent with the view that the two types of earnings attributes are premised on divergent views about the purpose of accounting. Third, within each of these sets of attributes, the correlations across the different measures are generally reliably positive, but, with the possible exception o( Relevance and Timeliness, not so strong as to indicate that any attribute subsumes another. We conclude that the seven earnings attributes are distinct constructs. ' ** The large dispersion in Consen'at'ism is driven by observations with small values of the denominator (P, ^) of (his variable. Consvrvausm = • (13, , + p,^)/p,,, Our lesls arc not aiTccled by extreme values of Cimsen'ulism (or extreme values of ulher attribute proxies) because our tests use tbe decile ranks of the variables. '^ Relevaiiic and Timeliness are expected to be correlated, given that the regressions have similar variables. The explanatory power of Equations (3) and (4) 
IV. INNATE DETERMINANTS OF EARNINGS ATTRIBUTES
The earnings attributes we consider are jointly delermined by intrinsic (innate) factors, such as firms' business models and operating environments, and by management's (discretionary) reporting and implementation decisions. The discretionary component of each attribute is composed of intentional reporting choices, forecasting errors, and implementation errors; we do not attempt to separate these effects. In addition to documenting the cost of equity effects of each attribute in total, we wish to isolate the pricing effect of the discretionary component of each attribute. To do this, we include in our tests controls for the innate determinants of the earnings attributes. For this purpose, we augment the five innate factors considered by Dechow and Dichev (2002) a.s explaining accrual quality (firm size, cash flow variability, sales variability, length of operating cycle, and incidence of negative earnings realizations) with three variables shown by prior research to influence one or more of the other earnings attributes: absence of intangibles, intangibles intensity, and capital intensity."' Briefly. Dechow and Dichev (2002) posit and find that accrual quality is inversely associated with firm size, and positively related to cash flow variability, sales variability, operating cycle, and incidence of losses. We include measures of intangibles use based on prior .studies* findings that expenditures on R&D and/or advertising lead to important differences in some of the earnings attributes. In particular. Francis and Schipper (1999) find that value relevance differs between high-tech firms (with mean R&D spending of 9.2 percent of assets) and low-tech firms (with mean R&D spending of O.K percent of assets): Penman and Zhang (2(X)2) argue that the expensing of R&D and advertising is an important determinant of conservatism; and Baginski et a!. (1999) show thai intangibles intensity is positively related to earnings persistence. Consistent with the view that capitalintensive lirms have greater volatility in earnings due to higher operating leverage, Baginski et al. (1999) , as well as Lev (1983) , find that more capital-intensive fimis have less persistent earnings than less capital-intensive firms.
The innate factors are measured as follows. Firm size is proxied by the log of total assets iAssets); we obtain similar results using sales revenues. Cash flow variability, (j(CFO), is calculated as the standard deviation of the firm's rolling ten-year cash flows from operations, scaled by total assets. Sales variability, irisales), is the standard deviation of the firm's rolling ten-year sales revenues, scaled by total assets. Operating cycle, OperCyvle, is the log of the sum of the firm's days accounts receivable and days inventory. Incidence of negative earnings realizations. Nef^Eurn. is measured as the firm's proportion of losses over the prior ten years. Intangibles intensity. Int-Intensity. equals the sum of the firm's reported R&D and advertising expense as a proportion of its sales revenues; missing values of R&D and advertising expense are set to zero. The absence of reported intangibles is captured by an indicator variable, lnl_Dumnn\ equal to I for firms with Int-lnlensity = 0. and 0 otherwise. Finally, capital intensity, Cap^ntensity, is proxied by the ratio of the net book value of property, plant, and equipment to total assets. Assets, 0.060 for a{CFO\ 0.215 for a{Sales), 141 days for OperCyde, and 10 percent for NegEarn. A comparison of median values of these variables produce.s similar results (not reported). Turning to the variables capturing intangibles intensity and capital intensity, we note that about 38 percent of our sample firm-years report zero expenditures on R&D and advertising. For all sample firms (including those with Int-Inlenslty = 0). the mean value of Int-Intensity is 6.4 percent. Finally, the mean value of Cap^Intensity is 37 percent.
To determine the importance of the innate determinants and common factors in explaining earnings attributes, we estimate annual regressions of each attribute on the eight innate determinants. Table 4 , Panel B reports the mean of the 27 coefficient estimates, where t-statistics are based on the standard error of the 27 yearly estimates. The results show that the innate determinants explain the most cross-sectional variation in AccrualQuality (55 percent); this compares to 15 percent, 24 percent, and 33 percent for Persistence, Predictability, and Smoothness, respectively. The abiUty of the innate factors to explain the market-based earnings attributes is much lower: 5 percent or less. We view these results as indicating that innate determinants explain a potentially significant amount of the variation in the accounting-based attributes and little or no variation in the market-based attributes. In tests that include the innate determinants as control variables, we interpret the estimated coefficient on the earnings attribute as a measure of the cost of capital effects of the discretionary portion of that attribute.
The discretionary portion will have a discernible cost of capital effect (just as the earnings attribute as a whole has such an effect) to the extent that its components (which include forecasting and implementation errors as well as possibly biased accruals in response to perverse incentives) give rise to nondiversifiable information risk. A natural question to ask is whether the portion of the discretionary component attributable to deliberate managerial choices can have, in equilibrium, a cost of capital effect? In particular, Ittner and Larcker (2001) argue that in the presence of consistently optimal managerial choices, there will be no relation between firm performance and the observed choice variables, controlling for exogenous determinants of those choices.'^ However, we believe a relation between discretionary components of earnings attributes and the cost of equity will persist in equilibrium, because the cost of equity is not a performance measure; it is a measure of required return (theoretically, a returns-based performance measure is abnormal return, i.e., total return less required return). In particular, we expect managers will take some actions that increase risk (information uncertainty as well as other risks) provided that the riskadjusted pay-off of those actions is positive. In such situations, we would observe a higher cost of capital even though the managerial choices that gave rise to it are optimal. Stated differently, in both the Easley and O'Hara (2004) model and the Leuz and Verrecchia (2004) model, all that matters is uncertainty about the pay-off structure; the source of that uncertainty is not relevant. This reasotiing is similar to other equilibrium asset-pricing models, such as the CAPM where only beta matters for the cost of capital. In a CAPM world there may be determinants of beta (such as a firm's business model) that are affected by managerial choices; however, regardless of the source of these effects, beta remains the primitive element of the cost of capital.
V. CROSS-SECTIONAL TESTS
In this section, we report the results of our main tests and the results of sensitivity tests. Our analyses use the annual VL-based ex ante cost of equity estimates, control variables.
" Consistent with this view, Cohen (2Of)3) argues that reporting quality is endogenous, and that once all exogenous factors are controlled for, there should be no pricing effect of reporting quality.
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and earnings attributes. Our control variables are the innate determinants previously discussed and risk proxies known to infiuence the cost of capital: beta, firm size, and bookto-market ratio (e.g.. Fama and French 1993) . We measure firm/s beta (Beta) in year t using the CAPM, estimated using monthly returns data over rolling ten-year windows; we require a minimum of 24 monthly returns. Firm size (Size) is measured as the log of firm /s market value at the end of fiscal year t-\. The book-to-market ratio (BM) equals the log of firm /s book value of equity (Compustat #60) divided by its market value of equity, both measured at the end of fiscal year t-\. Similar to the treatment of the earnings attributes, we assign values of Beta, Size, and BM to each year with a three-month lag to ensure the information is known to the market. To compare coefficient estimates across attributes, we rank each attribute each year, and form deciles. Firms in the top decile (decile I) have the smallest values of the attribute, while firms in the bottom decile (decile 10) have the largest values of the attribute. Given the definitions of our attribute measures, this ordering places firms with the best (worst) outcome for the attribute in the top (bottom) deciles. Using the decile rank of each attribute, rather than its raw value, alleviates the effects of extreme observations and allows us to interpret the resulting coefficient estimates as the incremental risk premium associated with adjacent deciles. To the extent that the attribute captures elements of information risk priced by investors, we expect a positive coefficient on the decile rank, indicating that investors attach higher risk assessments to stocks with less favorable (i.e.. larger) values of each attribute.
Main Tests and Results
We begin by examining the relations between the implied cost of equity and earnings attributes for each year t, controlling for known risk proxies:'"
Attribute''^, = the decile rank of firm /s value of the kth earnings attribute in year t, , lAccrualQuality, Persistence. Predictability, Smoothness, \ Relevance, Timeliness, Conservatism
To mitigate concerns about cross-sectional dependencies in the data, we estimate Equation (5) for each of the 27 years in our sample. We report the mean of the yearly coefficient estimates, and assess statistical significance using the time-series standard errors of these estimates (Fama and MacBeth 1973) . To assess the sensitivity of our results to this procedure, we also estimate pooled regressions where we assess statistical inference using Newey and West (1987) standard errors, which control for unspecified heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation effects. Resuhs of these pooled regressions (not reported) yield similar inferences as the annual regressions. . This regression provides a validation of our CofC estimates; we expect these estimates to be positively related to Beta (firms with higher betas have higher costs of equity), negatively related to Size {smaller firms have larger costs of equity), and positively related to BM (firms with larger book-to-market ratios have higher costs of equity). The mean coefficients on these variables are consistent with all three relations. Specifically, the mean coefficient on beta of 5.48 (t-statistic = 14.49) indicates an average implied market risk premium of 5.48 percent for our sample, similar in magnitude to historical market risk premia used in prior studies. The negative mean coefficient on Size indicates that, for our sample, large stocks have smaller expected returns (\-,, = -0.602, t-statistic = -4.22). Finally, the mean positive coefficient on the book-to-market ratio of {\i, = 1.357, t-statistic -3.48) indicates that firms with larger book-to-market ratios have higher implied costs of equity than firms with smaller book-to-market ratios. Panel B of Table 5 reports results of estimating Equation (5) adding, individually, the accounting-based earnings attributes. Based on analytical models that show that information quality is priced, we expect that the coefficient estimate on each attribute is positive. X> 0, indicating higher costs of equity for firms with worse outcomes of the attribute. Turning first to accrual quality, the results show a mean estimate of \^ = 0.412 (t-statislic = 11.60). This finding suggests that firms with the worst accrual quality experience a 371 (0.412 times nine decile differences) basis point (bp) higher cost of equity capital relative to firms with the best accrual quality. The next largest effect is found for Persistence, where the mean estimate of X^ = 0.216 (t-statistic -5.85) suggests a spread of 194 bp between firms with the least and most persistent earnings. The third largest cost of capital effect is associated with Smoothness, \^ = 0.125 (t-statistic = 4.32). The cost of equity effect of Predictability is indistinguishable from zero (^4 = 0.046, t-statistic = 0.79).
Panel C of Table 5 reports results adding the innate determinants to Equation (5). As expected, many of the coefficient estimates on the innate variables are highly significant, indicating that CofC estimates are partially explained by innate determinants of earnings attributes. Including these determinants decreases the estimated coefficients (and their related t-statistics) for AccrualQuality and Persistence; specifically, in Panel C AccrualQuality has a coefficient estimate of 0.290 (t-statistic = 8.63), compared to 0.421 in Panel B and the coefficient on Persistence is 0.113 (t-statistic = 2.52) versus 0.216 in Panel B. Including the innate determinants increases the coefficient estimate and related t-statistic for Smoothness to 0.223 (t-statistic = 9.22) from its value of 0.125 in Panel B. Finally, including the innate determinants shifts the statistically insignificant coefficient on Predictability to a negative 0.184 (t-statistic = -4.39).
We interpret these results as indicating that cost of equity effects of management's reporting choices-particularly those that affect accrual quality and earnings persistence-are generally smaller than the overall (innate plus discretionary) effects of these attributes, but are generally still beneficial. Exceptions concern the results for Smoothness and Predictability, where we are cautious about drawing inferences about the effects of management actions. In the case of Smoothness, the inclusion of the standard deviation of cash flows as an innate factor alters the interpretation of the coefficient on Smoothness: in particular, it becomes a measure of the cost of equity effect of. essentially, earnings variability (we elaborate on this issue in sensitivity tests described in Section V). In the case of Predictability, the result, taken at its face value, implies that after controlling for innate factors that affect earnings predictability, managements' discretionary actions to increase earnings predictability have adverse cost of equity effects. Consistent with the discussion in Section II, and notwithstanding analysts' characterizations of predictability as a desirable earnings attribute, we interpret this result as suggesting that predictability is not in and of itself desirable, in the sense of reducing information risk; in fact, predictability that exists over and above that implied by innate determinants contributes to information risk.'''
We perform the same analyses for the market-based factors; results are shown in Table  6 . The base model results are identical to those reported in Panel A of Table 5 and are not reported. Panel A shows the results of adding each of the market-based attributes to the base model. We find the largest coefficient estimate relating CofC to Relevance, X^ = 0.127 (t-statisUc = 2.88), followed by Timeliness, k^ = 0.083 (t-statistic = 1.81). and Conservatism, ^4 = 0.029 (t-statistic = 1.22). The magnitudes of these effects suggest that firms with the least value-relevant (least timely) earnings pay a premium of about 114 bp (75 bp) over firms with the most value-relevant (most timely) earnings. Adding the innate determinants to the regression (Panel B) reduces all the coefficient estimates and t-statistics; the coefficient on Relevance drops to 0.090 (t-statistic = 2.10) and the other two estimated coefficients lack significance at conventional levels. We interpret these results as suggesting that management's discretionary actions to affect Relevance. Timeliness, and Conservatism have relatively modest effects (or no effects at all) compared to the effects of innate factors, and that the cost of capital effects of market-based earnings attributes are generally smaller than those of accounting-based attributes.
To discern whether some of the earnings attributes we consider subsume the others in terms of cost of equity effects, we assess the incremental contribution of each attribute, in the presence of the others, to explaining implied costs of equity; Table 7 reports the results of estimating Equation (6) for the accounting-based earnings attributes (Model 1), the markel-based earnings attributes (Model 2), and all seven earnings attributes (Model 3). Panel A (Panel B) shows results excluding (including) the innate factors. Turning first to Panel A, the results of Model I show that Accrual Quality has the large.st pricing effects: X'"™"'' ""' ' ' > = 0.441 (t-statistic ^ 17.79), or a 397 bp cost of capital spread between the worst and best accrual quality firms. Controlling for other accountingbased attributes. Model I also shows the mean coefficient estimate on Persistence iŝ p^rsLsMu-,-^ 0.168 (t-statistic = 3,11). In the presence of the other accounting attributes, Smoothness is insignificantly related to CofC and Predictability takes on a negative coefficient, \P^''d<c«'>''>''y = -0.199 (t-statistic = -2.80). That is, once we control fox AccrualQuality and Persistence, an unfavorable outcome on Predictability or Smoothness no longer has a reliably positive association with the cost of equity. Controlling for innate determinants of the attributes, the results in Panel B show that the discretionary cost of equity effect ofAccrualQuallty is 262 bp (\f-"""iQ""'i'> = 0.291, t-statistic = 8.66). The discretionary cost of equity effects for Persistence and for Smoothness are smaller, 120 and 203 bp, respectively (both significant at the O.OOl level) and those for Predictability are reliably negative. We interpret these results as broadly supporting the inferences we drew from considering the accounting-based attributes one at a time, in Table 5 .
The results of Model 2 reveal that only Relevance is a distinctly priced market-based earnings attribute, regardless of whether we condition on innate factors. Specifically, the As discussed in Sections V and VI, this result is sensitive to alternative proxies for the cost of equity and an alternative measure of Predictability, For these alternatives, we Hnd a weak positive association or no association betvi-een the cost of equity and Predictability. Table 1 for a description of the Value Line (VL) sample, Table  3 for definitions of the attributes, and Table 4 for definitions of ihe innate determinants. mean estimate of x^^'''^-"'"'^ = 0.134 {Panel A, t-statistic ^ 3.40) suggests a 121 bp spread between the best and worst value-relevance firms: this effect is reduced to 0.097 (Panel B, t-statistic = 2.73) when we condition on innate factors. Neither Conservatism nor Timeliness is reliably associated with the cost of equity in the presence of Relevance.
Results including the innate factors and all earnings attributes are reported in the far right columns of = 1975-2001 , we estimate the cross-sectional relalion between VL CofC estimates, and known risk factors {Beta, Size, and BM). innnte faclors, and the decile ranks of the earnings altrihules considered joinliy. We report the mean of the yearly coofticient eslimates; t-statistics are based on the standard errors of the time-series of 27 estimates. Model I shows results for the set of accounting-based attributes: Model 2 shows results for the set of market-based atlributes; and Model 3 shows resulls for all attributes. Panel A reports results excluding the innale factors and Panel B reports results including them as independent variables. '' Each year, we assess the incremental explanatory power of the accounting-based attributes (Model 3 versus
Model 2) and of the market-based attributes (Model 3 versus Model 1|. We report the mean incremental explanatory power calculated across the 27 yearly estimates, along with t-statistics of whelher that mean difference is reliably different from zero. Sample description and variable definitions: Sec Table 1 for a description of the Value Line (VL) sample, Table  3 for definitions of the attrihutes. and Table 4 for definitions of (he innate factors. Models 1 and 2. In particular, conditioning on innate factors (Panel B) we tind the largest effects for accrual quality (x^"™""^""'"^ = 0.289, t-statistic = 8.55), followed by smoothness (Xf """''"••" = 0.230, t-statistic = 10.60), persistence {K^"""'""-= 0.122, t-statistic = 2.72) and relevance (\^'-''-'"""'^ = 0.086, t-statistic = 2.58). Timeliness and Conservatism are lnsigniticantly associated with CofC, and Predictability retains its negative conditional relation with the cost of equity.
Tests of the incremental explanatory power of the accounting-based earnings attributes and of the market-based earnings attributes are reported in the bottom rows of each panel of Table 7 . These results show that both sets of attributes add signiticantly to each other and to risk proxies {Panel A), as well as to each other, risk proxies, and innate factors (Panel B) in explaining cross-sectional vaiiation in the cost of equity. In particular, the accounting-based attributes add an average of 2-3 percentage points in explanatory power (the average is calculated across the 27 yearly regressions), reliably different from zero at better than the 0.001 level. The incremental explanatory power provided by the marketbased attributes is smaller, averaging 0.7 percentage points (t-statistic = 3.72). In unreported tests comparing the difference in incremental R-s provided by accounting-based attributes versus market-based attributes (that is, the mean of 2-3 percent versus the mean of 0.7 percent), we tind that accounting-based attributes provide signiticantly more explanatory power than do market-based attributes (at the 0.001 level).
Summary and Sensitivity Tests
We draw several inferences from the results of the cross-sectional tests reported in Tables 5-7 . First, when considered individually, all but two attributes are associated with the cost of equity in the predicted way; the exceptions are Predictability and Conserx'atism where we find no reliable associations. Second, comparisons of incremental explanatory power show that accounting-based earnings attributes explain more of the variation in ex ante estimates of the cost of equity than do market-based earnings attributes. Third, among the accounting-based earnings attributes, accrual quality is the most priced earnings attribute, followed by persistence and smoothness. Fourth, among the market-based earnings
The Accounting Review. October 2004 attributes, only value relevance is consistently associated with ex ante cost of equity estimates. Fifth, when we control for innate determinants, the cost of equity effects are generally smaller, as we would expect. We interpret the resulting coefficient estimates controlling for innate factors as capturing the cost of equity effects of management's reporting choices and estimates.
We perform numerous sen.sitivity checks on the results in Tables 5-7 . First, we examine the sensitivity of the findings to the choice of the benchmark model of expected returns. Results {not reported in tables) based on the CAPM generally show larger cost of equity effects for the earnings attributes; however, the pattern of the effects is preserved.
Second, we use an alternative method to identify the discretionary component of each earnings attribute. Specifically, we calculate the prediction errors from annual regressions of each earnings attribute on the eight innate factors, Disc^ttrihute^. We analyze the pricing effects of the discretionary component by substituting Disc-Attribute^ for Attribute^. Results (not reported in tables) show that, with the exception of accrual quality, the cost-of-equity effects are similar to those reported in the tables. In the case of accrual quality, we find a smaller pricing effect for Disv^ttribute^ '"'""'^""'''^ (120 bp [t-statistic = 3 .95] versus 261 bp in Table 5 ).
Third, we evaluate the robustness of our findings to using the level of total accruals as the measure of accrual quality. Firms with larger values of absolute total accruals (where total accruals, TA, is defined as in Equation (I)) are expected to have larger cost of equity premiums than firms with smaller values of absolute TA. Results (not reported) using the total accruals measure are similar to those based on AccrualQuality.
Fourth, we evaluate an alternative measure of earnings predictability based on analysts' forecast errors taken from the Zacks database for 1980-2000 (the period over which Zacks data are available); specifically, for each firm, we calculate the average absolute forecast error of analysts" annual earnings forecasts. Forecast error is mea.sured as the analyst's forecast of EPS less reported EPS, scaled by share price ten days before the forecast date. We do not regard this measure of earnings predictability as a measure of an accountingbased attribute because it introduces behavioral influences in at least two forms. First, the measure contains the effects of analysts' self-selection biases, cognitive biases, and their incentives for optimism; second, it contains the effects of management "guidance" to analysts (see, for example. Bartov et al. 2002) . Both influences are expected to affect forecast errors, but do not necessarily affect the quality of information contained in the earnings number itself. (However, management manipulations of earnings in order to affect analyst forecast erTors could very well affect the quality of the information in earnings.) If the analyst-based predictability measure is an instrument for the accounting-based measure, then we expect that larger absolute forecast errors are associated with larger costs of equity than smaller forecast errors. Results (not reported) using this analyst-based proxy for earnings predictability show positive cost of equity effects (t-statistics of 2.22 unconditional on innate factors and 1.70 conditional on innate factors).
Fifth, we evaluate an alternative measure of conservatism based on Penman and Zhang's (2002) C-Score measure, which equals the sum of the LIFO reserve, estimated R&D assets, and estimated advertising assets, scaled by net operating assets. Following their procedures, we calculate C-scores for all sample firms with a positive value of at least one of the reserve items (14.620 firm-years and 1,448 distinct firms), and we repeat the tests in Tables  6 and 7 for this measure. Results (not reported) are consistent with the previously documented results insofar as we find that the coefficient e.stimates on C-score are generally not reliably different from zero. Penman and Zhang (2002) also calculate a Q-score that captures the effect of conservatism on the quality of earnings; results using Q-scores (not reported) shovf smaller effects than C-score.
Our final sensitivity check considers earnings variability as an instrument for accrual quality and smoothness. Following Dechow and Dichev (2002) , we measure earnings variability as the rolling ten-year standard deviation of tirm/s net income before extraordinary items, scaled by beginning of year total assets, EarnVarj, = (riNlBEj,). Larger (smaller) values of EarnVar indicate more (less) volatile earnings. For the Full Sample, the mean and median values of EarnVar are 0.048 and 0.033, respectively, with a standard deviation of 0.049 (not reported). As would be expected given our characterization of EarnVar as an instrument for AccrualQuality and Smoothness, it is highly correlated with both: the Pearson (Spearman) correlations between EarnVar and AccrualQuality and Smoothness are 0.77 (0.84) and 0.57 (0.66), respectively. Finally, EarnVar is strongly associated with the innate determinants; together, they explain 67 percent of the variation in EarnVar (recall, from Table 4 , that the highest explanatory power of the innate determinants for an earnings attribute is 0.55, for AccrualQuality). Table 8 reports results of re-estimating Equation (6) to include the decile-ranked values of EarnVar. -" Beginning from the left, the first and second sets of results show the cost of equity effect of earnings variability unconditionally and conditional on innate determinants. Specifically, we find a 382 bp unconditional difference (t-statistic = 10.87) between the most and least variable earnings deciles and a 329 bp conditional diiference (t-statistic = 10.42). The far right columns show the results of adding other earnings attributes (both unconditionally and conditioned on innate determinants); we believe these results should be interpreted carefully because of significant collinearity among EarnVar, Smoothness, and (j(CFO) . The cost of equity effect of earnings variability increases to 472 bp (unconditional result, t-statistic = 12.64) and 477 bp (conditional result, t-statistic = 7.56), and there is a pronounced effect on the results for both AccrualQuality and Smoothness. The cost of equity effect of AccrualQuality, conditional on other earnings attributes and innate determinants, decreases to 135 bp (t-statistic = 4.40) from its value of 260 bp in Panel B, Table 7 ; the cost of equity effect of Smoothness, conditional on other earnings attributes and innate determinants, becomes negative or insignificant in the presence of EarnVar. These results indicate that EarnVar acts as a powerful instrument for both AccrualQuality and Smoothness and therefore captures aspects of the cost of equity effects of these attributes.
VI. ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF THE COST OE EQUITY
In this section we examine whether our results are robust to two alternative proxies for the cost of equity capital. The first examines CofC estimates derived using earnings-based approaches and the second uses asset-pricing regressions based on realized returns.
Earnings-Based Cost of Equity Estimates
We consider the sensitivity of our VL CofC results to two PEG-based approaches to estimating the cost of equity. The first is the modified PEG ratio approach (MPEG) (Easton 2004, Equation (11) ), which proxies for the cost of equity as the positive root of rP J -(EPSj -EPS^)/P^i = 0, where r is the implied cost of equity, DPS is the -" We use decile ranks in itrdcr lo compare ihe cost of equity effects of EarnVar with the other attrihutes (which are also measured in decile ranks). The use of decile ranks also breaks the perlect collinearity that wouid exist atiiong u(CFO). EarnVar. and Smooihiess if these variables were measured using raw values: we note, however, that the correlation among these three variables remains high even using decile ranks. to T3 >, expected dividend per share, EPS, and EPS2 are the analyst consensus earnings per share forecasts, and P,, is the observed share price on the forecast date. The second is the PEG ratio approach (Easton 2004, Equation (12) ; Botosan and Plumlee 2005, Equation (4)), which proxies for cost of equity by r = \/(EPS2 -EPSt)/Pi,. For both approaches, we use end of fiscal year consensus analyst earnings forecasts from Zacks, and we set the expected dividend per share equal to last year's value. Following Easton (2004) , we also require that EPS2 ^ EPSj > 0. In total, these requirements produce a sample of 10,944 Hrm-year observations from 1980 to 2(H)0.
We begin with a comparison of the levels of the MPEG CofC estimates with the VL CofC estimates; results for PEG CofC are similar and are not discussed. To control for firm-specific factors affecting costs of equity, we focus this comparison on firms that have both VE CofC estimates and MPEG CofC estimates (n ^ 8,294 firm-year observations). For this sample, the average MPEG cost of capital of 17.1 percent (calculated using the joint estimation procedure prescribed by Easton 2004) is statistically indistinguishable from the 17.4 percent mean VE CofC estimate.
Next, we repeat the cross-sectional tests for the sample of firms for which we have MPEG CofC estimates (n = 10,944 firm-years). The main results, summarized in Table 9 , show roughly the same pattern of coefficient estimates on the earnings attributes as the VL CofC estimates. In general, these patterns are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of the innate determinants; the exceptions are that the positive coefficients on Predictability and Conservatism disappear when the innate determinants are included. We continue to find that the accounting-based attributes, generally, have substantially higher coefficients than the market-based attributes, and within the set of accounting-based attributes, AccrualQuality has the largest coefficient estimate (0.542, t-statistic = 10.63, unconditional on innate factors). When we condition on innate factors, the coefficient estimate on AccrualQuality decreases to 0.249 (t-statistic = 3.57), somewhat smaller than the coefficient on Smoothness (0.329, t-statistic = 6.03). We note that all coefficient estimates are larger using the MPEG CofC estimates than using the VE CofC estimates. While the larger coefficients for MPEG CofC could mean that the VE CofC estimates underestimate the effects of the attributes, it is also possible that the MPEG CofC estimates overstate these effects.
Asset-Pricing Regressions
Our second sensitivity test uses cost of equity proxies based on portfolios of realized returns, a traditional proxy for expected returns in the empirical asset-pricing literature. This proxy assumes rational expectations, i.e., that ex ante unknown information (information surprises) will cancel in aggregate, so that it is appropriate to use future realized returns as proxies for expected returns. In these research designs, it is crucial that inferences are based on portfolios to allow information surprises to cancel out. The realized returns approach provides two advantages. First, it is not based on estimates of the cost of equity capital, so it is not subject to the same sorts of concerns about measurement error. Second, it allows us to expand the sample considerably (we include all listed firms with at least 24 monthly returns over our 27-year sample period). Thus, selection bias due, for example, to the type of firms followed by analysts is not present. The use of realized returns also has two disadvantages: realized returns are noisy, necessitating large sample sizes, and the rational expectations assumption may not hold (that is, investors' expectations of future returns may differ from return realizations).
Concerning the first issue (sample size), because we use all listed firms with at least 24 monthly returns, we believe our portfolios are of sufficient size to mitigate concerns with the noise in realized returns. As for the second issue (the rational expectations assumption), our research design cannot address its validity. We note, however, that the main criticism against using realized returns to proxy for expected returns is that realized returns may be biased over the period of study (Elton 1999; Fama and French 2002) . For example, if there is systematic good news during the sample period, realized returns will be upwardly biased proxies for expected returns. In general, such bias will not affect analyses of crosssectional variation in expected returns; only if the bias is correlated with the investigation variables will inferences be affected. On this point, we are not aware of any study that links bias in realized future returns with the earnings attributes we examine. Further, we note that the cross-sectional determinants of ex ante cost of equity proxies (such as VL CofC estimates) are the same as the cross-sectional determinants of realized returns (beta, size, book-to-market; see, for example, Botosan and Plumlee 2005; Easton and Monahan 2004; Fama and French 1993) , suggesting that cross-sectional properties are not meaningfully affected by bias (if it exists) in realized returns.
Our asset-pricing tests use realized monthly returns, factor-mimicking portfolios, and time-series tests to assess the significance of each earnings attribute in explaining variation in returns. To conform the yearly measures of earnings attributes to the monthly CRSP returns, we assign the value of each yearly attribute to the months comprising that fiscal year. To ensure that these data are available to investors, we lag the assignments by three months, to allow for the 90-day lO-K filing period. (Because Equation (1), used to measure accrual quality, requires information about cash flows in year f+1, we lag the measure of accrual quality by one year to ensure that this information is known at time /.)
We begin by calculating a factor mimicking portfolio for each of the k earnings attributes. Factor';^, equal to the difference between the equally weighted monthly returns of firms in the bottom three attribute deciles (deciles 8, 9, and 10) and the equally weighted monthly returns of firms in the top three deciles (deciles 1, 2, and 3).^' This procedure yields a series of m = 324 monthly Factor^, returns for each of the it = 7 attribute factors. We use a similar procedure to calculate factor-mimicking portfolios for the eight innate determinants: Factor^,, I = [Assets, (T{CFO) , (T(sates) , OperCycle, NegEam, Int^ntensity, IntJDummy\ Cap-Intensity ] .
Correlation tests (not reported in tables) show that the innate mimicking factors are highly correlated with each other. We attempt to reduce this collinearity by reducing the dimensionality of the set of innate factors. Specifically, we perform a factor analysis to identify the N common factors that explain common variation in the eight innate factors. The factor analysis identifies two factors, which we label as CFl and CF2, in total, these factors explain 85 percent of the cumulative variation in the innate determinants. For each common factor, we calculate a factor-mimicking portfolio, Factor^J^ and Factor';,!'-. We use these two common factor-mimicking portfolios, rather than the eight innate factormimicking portfolios, in subsequent tests that condition on innate determinants of earnings attributes.
We assess the importance of each attribute factor in explaining asset prices by augmenting the standard three-factor pricing regression with Factor'^,;.
' Our construction of the attribute factors follows Carhart's (1997) construction of a price/returns momentum factor. Our results are not sensitive to whether we equally weight or value weight securities in the attribute mimicking portfolios. Results are also not sensitive to the cutoffs used to torn the factor; specifically, we draw similar inferences if we form the factor using the difference between the lop and bottom I, 2. or 4 deciles. Variants of Equation (7) are estimated oti a finn-specific basis for all listed firms with at least 24 monthly CRSP returns. Because our tests require data only on the attribute factors and the innate factor-mimicking portfolios (which are based on monthly stock returns), atid not on the underlying data supporting these factors (the eamitigs attributes and innate determinants themselves), these tests are not restricted to firms in the Full Sample. Stated differently, we use data on the earnings attributes and common factors for firms in the Full Sample to create Factor^^, Factor^^f^', and Factor';,^, which can then be correlated with the returns of any firm with returns data. The only requirement we impose is that the tiim have at least 24 monthly retutns observations to estimate Equation (7); in total J = 18,865 distinct firms meet this requirement (the "Traded Sample"), with these firms having a mean (median) number of observations of 110 (93) months. Table 1 shows that the Traded Sample comprises, on average, 99.2 percent of the CRSP market capitalization.
To benchmark our results, we estimate Equation (7) excluding the attribute factors and the innate factors. Panel A, Table 10 reports the mean coefficient estimates and adjusted R^s for the resulting three-factor pricing regressions, calculated across the J firm-specific regressions; t-statistics are based on the standard errors from the J coefficient estimates. Consistent with Fama and French (1993) , we find that the market risk premium (R^ki -Rf.) , the size factor (SMB), and the book-to-market factor {HML) have significant positive loadings (t-statistics range betweeti 22 and 156). The mean firm-specific adjusted R-for the three-factor regression is 14.3 percent.
Panel B of Table 10 shows the results of regressions that include Factor'',,, as an additional independent variable; these tests allow us to assess the degree to which each attribute factor overlaps with and adds to known risk factors in explaining returns. Our emphasis here is on the sign and statistical significance of the loadings on the attribute factors, not on the point estimates of those loadings." Results for the accounting-based attributes show that, in all cases. Factor^,,, enters with a significant positive loading. In particular, the mean loading on Factor^''''"''^""'"' is / = 0.523 (t-statistic = 47.85); / = 0.674 for Unlike the comparisons of poini eslimales in Section V. it is not straight!onvard to compare the magnitudes of the factor loadings because the factors themselves differ across attributes. While the mean values of the factors for accrual quality and earnings persistence are noticeably larger than other attribute taetors (20-26 bp per month for accrual quality and persistence versus less than 5 bp per tnonth for the others, not reported), we are hesitant to draw inferences from these means because, like known risk factors, the attribute factors display considerable over-time variation. As Fama and t-Vench (1997) discuss in the context of R^^^, ~ R,., SMB and HML. it is difficult to draw inferences about the magnitude of cost of capital effects when the standard error around the mean factor value is large. As a benchmark, Fama and French (1997. (t-statistic = 41.68), / = 0.515 for factor '''"''"-'"'-""' (t-statistic = 29.88) , and / = 0.594 for Factor-' ''"'""'""''"' {t-.statistic = 42.62 ). Turning to the results for the market-based attributes, each factor has a significant positive coefficient when added individually to the three-factor pricing regression (t-statistics range from 9.26 to 14.38).
Panel C of Table 10 shows that including the innate common factors reduces the loadings on the attribute factors. With the exception of Factor^ ''"''""'''"-'' ' the loadings on the accounting-based attribute factors remain reliably positive, though their magnitudes are between 13 percent and 57 percent of their values in Panel B. In contrast, none of the loadings on the market-based attribute factors has a positive sign when the innate common factors are also included in the regression.
Summary of Results Using Alternative Measures of the Cost of Equity
The results in Tables 9 and 10 are broadly consistent with the results reported in Section V. Holding constant the cross-sectional estimation procedure, MPEG-based proxies for the cost of equity capital yield similar results to those we document in Tables 5 and 6 . The pattern of results is similar, with accounting-based attributes showing larger cost of equity effects than market-based attributes, and among the accounting-based attributes, accrual quality has the largest effect. Results based on time-series asset pricing regressions show that, unconditional on innate determinants, all earnings attributes have significant positive loadings, consistent with firms with poor values of these attributes having higher costs of equity. When the innate factors are included, we continue to find positive loadings on most of the accounting-based attributes (except for a zero loading on persistence), but we find no evidence of risk premia associated with poor values of the market-based attributes.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Drawing on prior research, we identify seven earnings attributes-accrual quality, persistence, predictability, smoothness, value relevance, timeliness, and conservati.sm-that have been posited, individually or sometimes in pairs, to be desirable or advantageous. However, the benefits of the attributes are typically specific to the setting considered, so it is not possible to assess whether the earnings attributes are statistically and economically distinct, and whether one or a few of the attributes dominate the others. We calibrate these earnings attributes against the cost of equity capital, a summary indicator of investor resource allocation decisions, to learn which attributes are viewed by investors as conferring the greatest capital market advantage, as measured by a decreased cost of equity capital.
We generally find a .statistically reliable association between each earnings attribute considered individually and our proxy for the cost of equity; the exceptions (or least consistent relations) are found for predictability and conservatism. Conditional associations, which include all seven earnings attributes plus known risk factors and factors believed to determine the innate portions of the earnings attributes, show that the accounting-based earnings attributes explain more of the cross-sectional variation in cost of equity estimates than do the market-based attributes (value relevance, timeliness, and conservatism). Considered individually, accrual quality, earnings persistence, and smoothness have strong effects on the cost of equity, as does the market-based attribute value relevance. On the whole, the weight of the evidence suggests that, among the seven attributes we consider, accrual quality is the dominant attribute in terms of cost of equity effects. The findings are robust to estimation procedure (cross-sectional versus time-series tests). Because the validity of our results depends on the reliability of the cost of equity capital estimates we use, we consider several proxies for the cost of equity (estimates based on price targets and forecasted dividends; estimates based on PEG ratios; and estimates based on realized returns). Results are robust across these alternative proxies.
Evidence on the individual and conditional cost-of-equity effects of earnings attributes has practical value for investors, researchers, standard setters, and managers. With respect to investors, our results suggest that attributes of earnings (especially accrual quality) factor meaningfully into discount rates; such information could be used to improve both simple trading strategies {as discussed by Gebhardt et al. 2001 ) and the identification of comparable firms. With respect to researchers (who frequently use earnings attributes to compare earnings numbers or, more generally, to compare the reporting systems that produce earnings numbers), our results suggest that a focus on accounting-based attributes (rather than on market-based attributes) would allow for more sharply delineated comparisons in settings where the consideration of earnings numbers or reporting systems is linked to investors' resource allocation decisions. With respect to accounting standard setters (who use decision usefulness as the benchmark to calibrate their decisions), our results suggest that they need not be as concerned as previous research might suggest about the apparent declining value relevance of earnings (Erancis and Schipper 1999; Collins et al. 1997) or about the increasing conservatism of earnings (Givoly and Hayn 2000) since neither of these two attributes features as prominently into the cost of equity capital as do accounting-based attributes. Finally, with respect to firm management, our results showing a link between the cost of equity and earnings properties (both total and discretionary) supports recent survey evidence documenting that top management believes that the quantity and quality of information influence their cost of capital (Graham et al. 2003) .
Our results suggest the possibility that changes in certain attributes of earnings, such as accrual quality, persistence or smoothness, affect the equity cost of capital. We expect that discretionary components of earnings attributes arc likely to be quicker to change than innate components; the degree to which either component will change over time is a function of both management's incentives (e.g., to increase or decrease accrual quality) and opportunities for change (e.g., by adding or dropping a line of business). Testing for cost of equity effects of changes in earnings attributes would require an over-time analysis. Our use of firm-specific measures of the attributes makes it difficult to perform over-time tests because we require relatively long periods to measure the attributes for a given firm. An avenue for future research would be to examine whether over-time changes in non-firmspecific measures of earnings attributes (for example, Barth and Landsman's [2003] crosssectionally calculated, industry-adjusted measure of value relevance) are reliably associated with over-time changes in the cost of equity.-^'
